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moving from
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(1)
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There are historians and others who would like to make a neat division
between "historical facts" and "values." The trouble is that values even
enter into deciding what count as facts-there is a big leap involved in
'raw data" to a judgement of fact. More important, one finds
that the more complex and multi-levelled the history is, and the more
important the issues it raises for today, the less it is possible to sustain a
fact-value division. But this by no means implies that there has simply to be
a conflict of prejudices and biases, as the data are manipulated to suit one
worldview or another. What it does mean is that the self of the historian is
an important factor. The historian is shaped by experiences, contexts, norms,
values, and beliefs. When dealing with history, especially the sort of history
that is of most significance in philosophy, that shaping is bound to be
relevant. As far as possible it needs to be articulated and open to discussion.
The best historians are well aware of this. They are alert to many
dimensions of bias and to the endless (and therefore endlessly discussable)
significance of their own horizons and presuppositions. A great deal can of
course be learned from those who do not share our presuppositions. Our
capacity to make wise, well-supported judgements in matters of historical
fact and significance can only be formed over years of discussion with others,
many of whom have very different horizons from our own. It is possible to
I have a 12-year-old chess champion or mathematical or musical genius, but it
is unimaginable that the world's greatest expert on Socrates could be that
age. The difficulty is not just one of the time to assimilate information; it is
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